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This paper examines China’s actions through the lens of the Genocide 
Convention to examine the whether the crimes of genocide are being 
committed against the Uyghur population. It contends that according to the 
Genocide Convention, China is committing genocide, and particularly 
through conditions, torture, and rape, against the Uyghur population. 
However, prosecuting a genocide in court would prove difficult due to 
China's laws and actions that can be used to defer accusations of genocide 
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“In addition, after careful examination of the available facts, I have determined 
that the PRC, under the direction and control of the CCP, has committed genocide 
against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious 
minority groups in Xinjiang. I believe this genocide is ongoing, and that we are 
witnessing the systematic attempt to destroy Uyghurs by the Chinese party-
state.”- Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo1 
 
For decades, the Uyghurs in China have  experienced discrimination by 
the Chinese government, which in recent years has escalated, taking the form of 
more violent and repressive actions.  Discrimination against the Uyghurs in China 
has been going on since as early as 1931, stepping up in the 1950s and 1970s, and 
coming to their crux in the 2000s and 2010s.  Early reports of reeducation camps 
and intense surveillance of the Uyghurs in 2015 made it to mainstream media but 
were otherwise forgotten about by the public and governments alike.  Only as 
increasingly horrific reports continue to flow out of China has the international 
community begin to voice criticism.  It has become widespread knowledge that 
China’s Uyghur “reeducation camps” more resemble prison camps, but little in 
the way of international action has been taken.  Recent governmental reports, 
witness testimonies, and scholarly literature show the scale of the atrocities 
currently being committed in Xinjiang.  
 This paper examines China’s actions through the lens of the Genocide 
Convention to examine the whether the crimes of genocide are being committed 
against the Uyghur population. It contends that according to the Genocide 
 
1 Pompeo, Michael. Determination of the Secretary of State on Atrocities in Xinjiang, U.S. 
Department of State, 19 Jan. 2021. 
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Convention, China is committing genocide, and particularly through conditions, 
torture, and rape, against the Uyghur population.  However, prosecuting a 
genocide in court would prove difficult due to China's laws and actions that can 
be used to defer accusations of genocide and problems with the Genocide 
Convention in the context of China and the Uyghurs. 
 The Xinjiang Conflict is unique in the sense that it is not an obvious 
genocide. The conflict has not created a rapid death rate or high number of 
asylum seekers. While the actions of the Chinese government may not be as 
forceful or obvious as previously identified genocides such as the Holocaust, the 
genocide against the Bosnian Muslims, and the genocide in Rwanda, they 
nevertheless appear to meet the criteria for genocide laid out in the Genocide 
Convention. 
 The first chapter of this paper provides context, background, and factual 
information on the Xinjiang Uyghur population and the history of relations 
between the Chinese government and Uyghurs.  It will discuss historical aspects 
of the conflict as well as data on the current environment for Uyghurs in Xinjiang, 
including conditions inside and outside the “reeducation camps” as well as 
surveillance and cultural destruction.  This section is intended to help understand 
the who, why, and how in the legal matter of genocide. 
 The second chapter is a legal analysis of the facts presented in the first, 
and intends to elaborate on the conditions within Xinjiang as well as examining 
the facts alongside the Genocide Convention.  Previous case law and international 
law (including excerpts from cases dealing with the Rwandan Genocide and 
5 
Holocaust) are used to further examine the situation in Xinjiang. Secondary 
scholarly literature is also used as a supplement to better understand the situation 
at hand.   
The third chapter will analyze how China is legitimizing its actions in 
Xinjiang, as well as deferring legal pressure.  It will discuss how China attempts 
to use post-911 anti-terrorism sentiment and a reservation to Article IX of the 
Genocide Convention to defer inquiry into the actions of Beijing in Xinjiang.  It 

















Chapter One: Background 
 
The Uyghurs 
The Uyghurs have lived in the Kashgar region (Xinjiang, or East 
Turkestan) since the sixth century, and are among the oldest Turkic-speaking 
people of Central Asia. The region is currently the only region in China with a 
Muslim majority and is bordered by multiple Islamic countries.  
The Turkic Uyghur Empire began in the eighth century in the region 
nearest Mongolia. It comprised multiple Sufi city-states under the Naqshbandi 
Sufi Order, where the Uyghur identity developed over centuries in oasis towns.2  
Over time, the many Uyghur settlements became predominant in Xinjiang. Some 
Uyghurs assimilated into the local Buddhist culture, but a strong majority 
maintained their religion and culture.  The region was completely Islamized by 
the fourteenth century. In 1679, the legendary Apaq Khoja3, descendant of the 
Sikhs of Samarkand, took power in Xinjiang and ruled the region until the Qing 
Dynasty took control for strategic purposes in 1759.  The Qing government began 
to call the region Xinjiang, which means new dominion or new frontier, and 
exerted their rule through puppet governments.4 
There were many attempted revolts against Qing leadership. The most 
successful was in 1867 and led by Yakub Beg, who based his legitimacy on 
 
2 “Uyghur.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 2020, 
www.britannica.com/topic/Uyghur.; Shiel, Fergus. “China Cables: Who Are the Uyghurs and 
Why Mass Detention?” ICIJ, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, 25 Nov. 2019,  
3 Waite, Edmund. “From Holy Man to National Villain: Popular Historical Narratives About Apaq 
Khoja amongst Uyghurs in Contemporary Xinjiang.” Inner Asia, vol. 8, no. 1, 2006, pp. 5–28. 
JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/23615516.  
4Dillon, Michael. “A Uyghurs' History of China.” History Today, History Today: Volume 70 Issue 
1, Jan. 2020, www.historytoday.com/archive/behind-times/Uyghurs%E2%80%99-history-china.  
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Naqshbandi tradition. His regime was overthrown in 1878 by Zuo Zongtang, who 
had already suppressed a rising of Hui Muslims in China. Xinjiang was formally 
incorporated into China in 1884.5  
 After the Qing Dynasty fell in 1911, the Chinese warlord government of 
Xinjiang was de facto independent.   Three main Islamic states were created in the 
region at this time during an intertwinement between Xinjiang and the USSR. In 
1933, the Xinjiang governor accepted military assistance from the USSR, and 
during the last decade,  accepted much “economic and cultural assistance” from 
the USSR.6  In 1943, the VKP(b) CC Politburo decreed USSR support for non-
Chinese rebels (including the Uyghurs) “in their struggle against the repressive 
colonialist policy of the Governor.”7  
Conflict between the Chinese government and the Xinjiang autonomous 
region started in earnest in the 1950s, when the government began strongly 
promoting Chinese unity and slashing the autonomy the region had held under the 
Soviet-aligned East Turkestan Republic.8  This autonomy is alive in the memory 




6 RGASPI F. 17, Op. 162, D. 37, ll. 76-78. Obtained by Jamil Hasanli and translated by Gary 
Goldberg. 
7 The VKP(b) CC Politburo was a provision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, it listed multiple ways the USSR was prepared to help 
Xinjiang, including but not limited to: “a) for the equal rights of all ethnic minorities of Xinjiang; 
b) for the free development of the culture of each ethnic group, and for primary and secondary 
education in their native language at government expense; c) against religious oppression; ...“ Ibid. 
 
8 "Borders | Uyghurs and The Xinjiang Conflict: East Turkestan Independence Movement". 
apps.cndls.georgetown.edu.  
8 
In 1949, after Chiang Kai-Shek was defeated and Mao came into power, 
Mao and his government attempted to incorporate the region into the People’s 
Republic of China.  The government implemented moderate policies towards 
minorities, and Xinjiang was established as an autonomous region of China in 
1955.9  The Uyghur people countered with armed resistance; however, the 
beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 ultimately quashed the Uyghur 
rebellion.  
As a result of Xinjiang’s historical isolation from Chinese culture, 
Xinjiang remains an outpost of China, lacking the socio-economic and cultural 
power of Eastern China.  Xinjiang, in addition, is the only province with a 
Muslim majority.  Tibet and Xinjiang are the only regions in China where ethnic 
Chinese are a minority.  The Uyghurs make up 45% of around twenty million 




Ethnic Policy in China and the Xinjiang Conflict 
 
Ethnic policy in China has frequently changed since the establishment of 
the PRC in 1949, swinging between protection and destruction of ethnic 
minorities.  Mao Zedong’s transformation of China required the Chinese 
population to be racially, socially, ideologically, and politically homogeneous. To 
institute this, drastic and violent measures were used to unify the Chinese 
 
9 “History of Xinjiang.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 2018, 
www.britannica.com/place/Xinjiang/History.  
10 2000年人口普查中国民族人口资料 [Year 2000 China census materials: Ethnic groups 
population]. Nationalities Publishing House. September 2003. ISBN 7-105-05425-5. 
9 
population. During Mao’s Cultural Revolution, these measures included closing 
churches, mosques and temples, and forcing clergy into re-education11.  Monks 
were beaten or killed, and the possession of religious texts was criminalized.12   
The Xinjiang conflict started in earnest in the 1950s, when the government 
began strongly promoting Chinese unity and slashing the autonomy the region 
had held under the Soviet-aligned East Turkestan Republic.13  This autonomy is 
alive in the memory of many people who live in the region, and they are still 
inspired by Pan-Turkic ideals.  
In 1949, after Chiang Kai-Shek was defeated and Mao came into power, 
Mao and his government attempted to incorporate the region into the People’s 
Republic of China.  The government implemented moderate policies towards 
minorities, and Xinjiang was established as an autonomous region of China in 
1955.14  The Uyghur people countered with armed resistance; however, the 
beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 ultimately quashed the Uyghur 
rebellion.  
The perception of “regional autonomy” has been one of the main sources 
of conflict for Xinjiang.15  Extreme policy swings have had a significant effect on 
the region; relatively tolerant policies throughout the 1950s were replaced with 
 
11 Buang, Sa'eda; Chew, Phyllis Ghim-Lian (9 May 2014). Muslim Education in the 21st Century: 
Asian Perspectives. Routledge. p. 75. ISBN 9781317815006. 
12 Pittman, Don Alvin (2001). Toward a Modern Chinese Buddhism: Taixu's Reforms. University 
of Hawaii Press. ISBN 9780824822316.  
13 "Borders | Uyghurs and The Xinjiang Conflict: East Turkestan Independence Movement". 
apps.cndls.georgetown.edu.  
14 “History of Xinjiang.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 2018, 
www.britannica.com/place/Xinjiang/History.  
15 Bovingdon, Gardner. “Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur 
Discontent.” Washington, D.C.: East-West Center, vol. 11, 2004. Policy Studies.  
10 
strongly repressive and assimilationist ones during the Great Leap Forward in 
1958.  However, policies returned to moderation in the 1960s and then reversed 
again to repressive policies during the Cultural Revolution in 1966.  Deng 
Xiaoping’s loosening of cultural and economic policies in the early 1980s gave 
Xinjiang extra autonomy in these areas, but did not do much to relax political 
controls.  After demonstrations in 1988 and 1989, and a violent uprising in 1990, 
a political crackdown on Xinjiang was enacted; this included new cultural and 
religious regulations that have remained in place to-date.16 
In addition to Uyghur discontent, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 
showed Beijing the effect liberal policies could have; as a result, Beijing swung 
away from policies similar to those of the USSR and Mikhail Gorbachev.17  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkic people in Central Asia 
states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan gained independence, but the 
Uyghurs did not receive this liberation. The collapse of the Soviet Union raised 
fears in Beijing that Uyghur ethno-nationalists would be inspired by their newly 
independent Asian neighbors.  Under Beijing policy, many Han Chinese began 
immigrating to the region, which the non-Chinese felt would endanger their 
culture, economy, and politics.   
 
16 Ibid. 
17 Gorbachev instituted glasnost and perestroika, which was the opening of the Soviet Union and 
the reformation of the economic system to end central planning- arguably, the relaxing of rules 
could be viewed as bringing the downfall of the USSR. Dillon, Michael.; David S. Mason. 
“Glasnost, Perestroika and Eastern Europe.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International 
Affairs 1944-), vol. 64, no. 3, 1988, pp. 431–448. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2622850.  
11 
This led to the rise and fall of two Uyghur clandestine militant groups in 
Xinjiang and the Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan diaspora.18 After 
demonstrations in 1995, Beijing responded with the “Strike Hard” campaign and 
began to violently suppress demonstrations.   The government began punishing 
certain expressions of Uyghur identity, such as their religion and language.19 
The “Strike Hard” campaign was the beginning of the permanent religious 
suppression and persecution in Xinjiang. Now, anyone in the region suspected of 
sympathies for ‘separatism’ or illegal religious activity is subject to detainment 
without trial.   
Beijing also stepped up efforts to increase economic growth in Xinjiang, 
leading to the building up of  infrastructure in the province and mass Han 
migration there, as part of China’s “Go West” campaign.  The “Go West” plan 
was launched in 2000 to build the economies of comparatively under-developed 
western provincial-level regions.20  Beijing saw ramping up economic projects in 
Xinjiang as a way to increase integration from across China and therefore reduce 
local nationalism in Xinjiang.  These economic gains were unevenly distributed 
and benefited Han-Chinese migrants to the region over ethnic Uyghurs, leading to 
an exacerbation of inequality and marginalization.21 
 
18 On the rise of militant nationalism among young Uyghurs, see also the study by Joanne Smith, 
“Four Generations of Uyghurs: the Shift towards Ethno-political Ideologies among Xinjiang’s 
Youth”, Inner Asia, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2000, pp. 195-224.; Gardner, Bovington. “The Not-So-Silent 
Majority: Uyghur Resistance to Han Rule in Xinjiang”, Modern China, Vol. 28, No. 1, January 
2002, pp. 39-78.; Ibid. 
19 Human Rights Watch Special Report:  Devastating Blows Religious Repression of Uyghurs in 
Xinjiang. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, April 2005.  
20 Singh, Arvinder. “Understanding China's 'Go-West' Campaign.” China Report, vol. 38, no. 1, 
2002, pp. 121–127., doi:10.1177/000944550203800117.  
21 Dillon, Michael.  
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Xi Jinping came into power in 2013, succeeding Hu Jintao. Xi’s father, Xi 
Zhongxun, who became prominent in the CCP around 1952, had left a 
comparatively more liberal legacy towards reformation than his peers.  After the 
Communist victory in 1949, Zhongxun became the head of the Northwest Bureau.  
This department managed the Northwest section of China, including Xinjiang.  
The process of incorporating the Northeast into China was not a peaceful one; 
however, Zhongxun believed that “ethnic work” needed a soft touch and was a 
strong advocate for this idea.22 
This left Xi Jinping at a crossroads of debate over ethnic policy: his 
father’s more liberal methods versus the desire to not repeat the mistakes of the 
USSR.  Beijing saw ethnic division as one of the main factors impacting the 
USSR, and as a result, wanted to remove ethnic division as a possible threat.  To 
do this, Xi emphasized the “four identifications” which include the Chinese race, 
Chinese culture, the socialist road, and collective belonging through Mandarin 
instruction and patriotic education.  Under Xi Jinping, the Party emphasizes 
integration instead of ethnic diversity23 as the backbone of its political stability.  
 
22 “Incorporating the Northwest into the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was far from peaceful 
– about 90,000 so-called bandits were eliminated through defeat, surrender, or killing, and the 
famous Kazakh leader Osman Batur was executed.”; “In 1952, the two top leaders in Xinjiang, 
Wang Zhen and Deng Liqun, rejected the Northwest Bureau’s decision not to pursue major reform 
in nomadic areas. Zhongxun, their boss as leader of the Northwest Bureau, was 
furious...Zhongxun believed that Wang and Deng had made a series of mistakes that were linked 
by “incorrect adventurist-radical thinking.” He concluded that attacks on “Greater Turkestan” (a 
call for all Turkic people to be linked together politically)  had led to the wrongful arrests of many 
people. In the future, “oppose Greater Turkestan” would no longer be used as a slogan. Both 
Wang and Deng were fired.” Torigian, Joseph. “What Xi Jinping Learned-And Didn't Learn-From 
His Father About Xinjiang.” The Diplomat, The Diplomat, 3 Dec. 2019, 
thediplomat.com/2019/11/what-xi-jinping-learned-and-didnt-learn-from-his-father-about-
xinjiang/.  
23 Leibold, James. “China's Ethnic Policy Under Xi Jinping.” Jamestown, 18 Nov. 2016, 
jamestown.org/program/chinas-ethnic-policy-under-xi-jinping/.  
13 
Since Xi came into power, China has seen “a broader tightening of CCP control 
over civil society.”24  The goal of this policy is to control dissent.  
The most current, most pressing, and most dramatic cultural and anti-
religious campaign is against Uyghur Muslims in the western Xinjiang Province, 
where the population of the Uyghur people is concentrated, in an attempt to stifle 
the culture of any group in China other than the majority ethnicity--Han Chinese.   
This campaign is a weapon against the culture of Western China under the guise 
of anti-terrorism and nationalism. Beijing wants to unify the culture of China by 
making Chinese culture equivalent to Han culture as a way to maintain totalitarian 
control over the country.  Border cultures, such as the Uyghurs, threaten the 
control of the government by seeking autonomy from the majority Han.  To stifle 
Uyghur culture and separatism and to erase Uyghur ethnic identity, Beijing is 
working to eradicate religion and to displace the non-Han population. 
The Xinjiang Data Project views 2017 as the turning point in these 
hardline policies.25 This turning point came after a peak in violence involving 
Uyghurs in 2014 and 2015; data compiled based on newspaper reports indicated 
that there were a total of 19 incidents of Uyghur-perpetrated violence across 
China from 2014 to 2015, resulting in nearly 440 fatalities and 460 injuries.26 In 
contrast, in 2016 and 2017, there have been only three cases of such violence that 
killed 14 and injured 15 others.27  This turning point also coincides with the 
 
24 Cook, Sarah. “A Freedom House Special Report.” The Battle for China's Spirit, Feb. 2017.  
25 Ruser, Nathan. “Exploring Xinjiang's Detention System.” Xinjiang Data Project, Sept. 2020.  
26 Soliev, Nodirbek. “China: Xinjiang Province.” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, vol. 10, 
no. 1, 2018, pp. 53–56. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/26349855. Accessed 10 Apr. 2021. 
27 Ibid. 
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Trump administration’s de-emphasis on human rights as a component of foreign 
policy. 
 
Inside the Xinjiang Camps 
The detaining of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in internment 
camps is estimated to have begun in April of 2017, based on information from the 
China Cables, which was released in 2017.28  There are no clear estimates of how 
many Uyghurs are being detained; however, the UN estimates that at least one 
million and up to two million out of the ten million total population are in 
camps.29  Intelligence reports show that most people being held are not charged 
and information about their detainment is not shared, so there is also no way to 
contest detainment. In urbanized areas, most camps are converted schools or 
official buildings; however, in rural areas, many camps have been built 
specifically for the purpose of “re-education.”30   
Beijing considers these “internment camps'' to be vocational education and 
training facilities that are necessary to counter terrorism and alleviate poverty. 
 
28 Shiel, Fergus. “China Cables: Who Are the Uyghurs and Why Mass Detention?”; “Data Leak 
Reveals How China 'Brainwashes' Uyghurs in Prison Camps.” BBC News, BBC, 24 Nov. 2019, 
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-50511063.  
29Nebehay, Stephanie. “U.N. Says It Has Credible Reports That China Holds Million Uyghurs in 
Secret Camps.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 12 Aug. 2018.;  DeHahn, Patrick. “How Did We Get 
to the Number of 1.5 Million Muslims Imprisoned in China?” Quartz, Quartz, 4 July 2019, 
qz.com/1599393/how-researchers-estimate-1-million-uighurs-are-detained-in-xinjiang/.  
30Phillips, Tom. “China 'Holding at Least 120,000 Uyghurs in Re-Education Camps'.” The 
Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 25 Jan. 2018. 
15 
The Chinese government has stated that “vocational training” has increased job 
opportunities and helped combat poverty in the region.31  
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute has identified 380 detention 
camps across the region, with more currently under construction, ranging from 
low security camps (Security Tier 1) to fortified prisons (Security Tier 4).  
Chinese media has stated the re-education programs are winding down; however, 
aerial photography and studies show that through 2019 and 2020 there was 
significant investment put into building camps.32 At least 61 facilities were 
constructed between July 2019 and July 2020, with at least 14 still under 
construction. Most of these new facilities are high-security facilities. Tier 4 camps 
are guarded by armed forces and special police and are equipped with multiple 
layers of perimeter barriers, high walls, no outside yards, police facilities, guard 
rooms, security fences, surveillance, and watchtowers.33 Videos claimed to have 
been shot within the camps show jail-like cells that match the descriptions of 
former detainees.34 
 





32 Graham-Harrison, Emma. “China Has Built 380 Internment Camps in Xinjiang, Study Finds.” 




图什市人民政府, 新疆阿图什市人民政府办公室, 21 Feb. 2018, 
web.archive.org/web/20180706221430/http://www.xjats.gov.cn/P/C/1736.htm.;Ruser, Nathan. 
“Exploring Xinjiang's Detention System.” The Xinjiang Data Project, Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute , 24 Sept. 2020, xjdp.aspi.org.au/explainers/exploring-xinjiangs-detention-facilities/.  
34 Introvigne, Massimo. “Yingye'er Re-Education Camp Managed Like Prison.” Bitter Winter, 18 
Jan. 2019, bitterwinter.org/yingyeer-re-education-camp-managed-like-prison/. 
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U.S. intelligence states that the majority of people being detained at these 
camps are members of the Uyghur minority group.35  In 2018, The China Human 
Rights Defenders group along with Xinjiang’s Uyghur residents conservatively 
estimated that around ten percent of the Uyghur population is being held in these 
camps36, which is approximately 1.1 million people.  Similar numbers have been 
found by other sources, and this also falls within the United States estimate of 
800,000 to two million.37  There are no clear updated numbers, but as the number 
of camps built are increasing rapidly, it is safe to assume so is the number of 
Uyghurs being detained.   
An anonymous police officer in a village in Xinjiang reported that some 
police departments had a quota of how many people from the local population 
they were to detain--his particular department’s quota was forty percent of the 
local population.  The officer is quoted saying that he and the rest of his 
department “were told to target people who are religious...for example, those who 
grow beards despite being young.”38  Many officers have also gone on record 
saying these orders are made through online conferences, never by formal 
documentation.39   
 
35 Gaouette, Nicole, and Jennifer Hansler. “US Human Rights Report Notes Khashoggi Killing, 
Avoids Mention of Saudi Prince.” CNN, Cable News Network, 13 Mar. 2019, 
www.cnn.com/2019/03/13/politics/human-rights-2018-state-department/index.html. 
36 Hurd, Hilary. “China's Human Rights Abuses Against Uyghurs in Xinjiang.” Chinese Human 
Rights Defenders, 2018, www.nchrd.org/2018/12/chinas-human-rights-abuses-against-Uyghurs-
in-xinjiang/. 
37 Gaouette, Nicole, and Jennifer Hansler. 
38RFA Staff. “Nearly Half of Uyghurs in Xinjiang's Hotan Targeted For Re-Education Camps.” 




A resident of Luopo Country in southern Xinjiang says her province has a 
saying: “If you go into a concentration camp in Luopu, you never come out.”40  
While this phrase seems to ring true for most Xinjiang detention camps, some few 
who have made it out have spoken about what they saw and experienced. 
Sayragul Sautbay, an ethnic Kazakh, claims to be a previous employee of 
one of the detention camps in Xinjiang.  She said those who do not learn fast 
enough were deprived of food and were subject to sleep deprivation.41  A daily 
food ration was a piece of bread and one ladle of rice porridge three times a day.  
Inmates wear bright blue uniforms issued by the camp. All the men are forced to 
shave their heads against their religious custom.42 
On the specific conditions of the camps, Sautbay described sleeping rooms 
as overcrowded and unsanitary.  A bucket to be used as a toilet was kept in the 
same room used for sleeping, and when it was full, no one would empty it. Private 
use of the toilet was not allowed.43 
 
40Kuo, Lily. “'If You Enter a Camp, You Never Come out': inside China's War on Islam.” The 
Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 11 Jan. 2019, www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/11/if-
you-enter-a-camp-you-never-come-out-inside-chinas-war-on-islam.; 
41Sleep deprivation has been proven to cause anxiety, depression, and heart disease, and increase 
risks of cancer, stroke, and dementia.Lindholm, Marika, et al. “How Sleep Deprivation Hurts Your 
Mental Health.” Talkspace, 28 Sept. 2018, www.talkspace.com/blog/sleep-deprivation-hurts-
mental-health/#.;Regencia, Ted. “Escape from Xinjiang: Muslim Uyghurs Speak of China 
Persecution.” China | Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 10 Sept. 2018, 
www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/escape-xinjiang-muslim-Uyghurs-speak-china-persecution-
180907125030717.html. 
42 Regencia, Ted.  
43 Not being able to use the bathroom privately strips people of their sense of dignity and 
dehumanizes them.  Conditions like this have been proven to destabilize people’s mental state, and 
may cause PTSD. 
National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health (UK). Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: The 
Management of PTSD in Adults and Children in Primary and Secondary Care. Leicester (UK): 
Gaskell; 2005. (NICE Clinical Guidelines, No. 26.) 2, Post-traumatic stress disorder.; 
Novgorodoff, Danica, and Ben Mauk. 
18 
Sometimes at night, according to Sautbay, guards would take away young, 
unmarried girls for a prolonged time and bring them back, often in the middle of 
the night.  When the girls return, ”any normal person can see what kind of torture 
they have been through.  When they come back, they turn into a different person. 
I think they do all kinds of torture to them and sexually abuse them."44  Other 
women have reported being raped.45 
 
Outside the Camps 
Surveillance  
 The Uyghurs are living in an advanced police state; every aspect of life is 
monitored (for example: business, family, religion). Xinjiang has been split into a 
grid system, with every bloc having about 500 residents. Each bloc has a police 
station that closely monitors inhabitants by regularly scanning their identification 
cards, faces, DNA samples, fingerprints, and cell phones.  Surveillance cameras 
are placed throughout Xinjiang and in privately owned shops, even in the few 
remaining mosques, so that the government can watch all parts of cities at all 
times.  China uses a special monitoring system in Xinjiang called the Integrated 
Joint Operations Program (IJOP), which aggregates data and alerts authorities 
when it deems someone or something suspicious.  What data does it use?  Some 
 
44Rivers, Matt. “Former Xinjiang Teacher Claims Brainwashing and Abuse inside Mass Detention 
Centers.” CNN, Cable News Network, 10 May 2019, www.cnn.com/2019/05/09/asia/xinjiang-
china-kazakhstan-detention-intl/index.html. 
45Ferris-Rotman, Amie. “Abortions, IUDs and Sexual Humiliation: Muslim Women Who Fled 
China for Kazakhstan Recount Ordeals .” The Washington Post, WP Company, 5 Oct. 2019. 
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examples include but are not limited to:  blood type, height, electricity usage, gas 
usage, package deliveries, and internet history.  The IJOP is also connected to 
CCTV cameras enabled with facial recognition and night vision.46  
Systems are used to analyze behavior, anticipate crime, protests, and 
violence, and recommend which security forces to deploy.  The cameras in 
Xinjiang track Uyghurs while ignoring the Han, and suggest which citizens to 
send to detention camps based on the government’s criteria.47  Police and 
monitors question Uyghurs and search their homes at any time they please.  
Citizens are also graded for reliability; if a citizen has a low score they could be 
sent to detention. The social credit system in China is a nation-wide system; 
however, it is more heavily implemented in Xinjiang and also includes the threat 
of internment.48 
In addition to constant surveillance, the Uyghurs and other Muslims of 
Xinjiang are often subject to home stays from Chinese officials in a program 
called the “Becoming Family” Campaign. During these home stays, families are 
forced to house and feed Chinese officials, as well as provide information about 
their lives and political views.49 
 
 
46 “Interview: China's 'Big Brother' App.” Human Rights Watch, 28 Oct. 2020, 
www.hrw.org/news/2019/05/01/interview-chinas-big-brother-app.  
47 Buckley, Chris, and Paul Mozur. “How China Uses High-Tech Surveillance to Subdue 
Minorities.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 22 May 2019. 
48 Buckley, Chris, and Austin Ramzy. “Inside China's Push to Turn Muslim Minorities Into an 
Army of Workers.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 30 Dec. 2019, 
www.nytimes.com/2019/12/30/world/asia/china-xinjiang-muslims-labor.html.  
49 Wang, Maya. “China: Visiting Officials Occupy Homes in Muslim Region.” Human Rights 




In addition to camps and monitoring, Xinjiang is facing cultural 
destruction.  Since 2017, an estimated 16,000 mosques have been destroyed or 
damaged as a result of government policies, 65% of the total mosques in the 
province. It is estimated more than half have been completely destroyed.  
Included in the destruction is the culturally protected 16th century Grand Kargalik 
Mosque.  In 2019, it was replaced with a miniature recreation of its original 
entrance. Before it was destroyed, a banner was hung on the front of the mosque 
that read “爱党爱国” in both Chinese and Arabic, which translates “love the 
Party, love China.”  Due to government policies enacted since 2017, The Xinjiang 
Data Project estimates the number of mosques in Xinjiang is at its lowest level 
since the Cultural Revolution, when over 26,500 mosques were destroyed.50 
 In addition, even though many Uyghur sacred sites are protected under 
Chinese law, 30% of the sites across Xinjiang have been demolished and another 
28% damaged or altered since 2017.  These sites included the sacred pilgrimage 
site of Ordam Mazar, where the grandson of the first Muslim Uyghur king died in 
battle. The same month, leading Uyghur anthropologist and Xinjiang sacred site 
expert, Rahile Dawut, went missing.  He is just one of over 386 Uyghur 
intellectuals who have been detained since 2017.51 
 In May of 2018, the “four entrances” or “four requirements” campaign 
was launched in China to promote the “Sinicization” of religion.  This campaign 
 





requires that religious communities adapt to four requirements: “ritually raising 
the national flag, often while singing the national anthem; teaching believers 
about, and promoting, the Chinese Constitution, laws, and regulations; preaching 
and promoting the ‘Core Socialist Values’; and promoting ‘China’s excellent 
traditional culture.’”52  This involves the removal of Islamic architecture, such as: 
calligraphy, domes, the star and crescent and other symbols the government 
deems “foreign”.  All these traditional symbols of Islamic architecture must be 
replaced with traditional Chinese styles. 
 The Uyghurs of Xinjiang are currently living in a police state where their 
culture is being destroyed around them and internment is a constant threat.  This 
situation has evolved from years of conflict between the Chinese state and the 
Uyghur minority group.  The currently situation of the Uyghurs has brought about 
debate over whether this treatment is or is not a genocide.  In the following 
chapter, the facts of the conflict will be analyzed against the Genocide 
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www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_2138855.; Lin, Yijiang. “Sinicization Turns Churches into 




Chapter Two: According to the Law 
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Genocide Convention), which entered into force in January 1951, was 
the first time the crime of genocide was codified. Its recognizes that “at all 
periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity” and that 
international cooperation is required to “liberate humankind from such an odious 
scourge”. According to the Convention, genocide is a crime that can take place 
both in time of war as well as in time of peace.  
This was the first human rights treaty to be adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, signifying the International Community’s 
commitment to ‘never again’ allow genocide after the atrocities committed during 
the Second World War.53 
The prohibition on genocide is jus cogens norm (a peremptory norm 
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a 
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character).54 
Consequently, while the Genocide Convention codifies and elaborates what 
constitutes genocide, even in the absence of the treaty, genocide is always a 








The Xinjiang Crisis According to the Genocide Convention 
Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide lays out the definition of genocide as: 
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.55  
The Uyghur people are an ethnic and religious group, and are currently at 
the mercy of China’s policies.56 Under the guise of anti-terrorism, they are being 
eliminated “as such”, which falls within the protections of the Genocide 
Convention.  
This chapter analyzes the Xinjiang Conflict through the lens of the 
Genocide Convention. First, it analyzes the component of intent, which is 
required for there to be Genocide. Then it examines each subsection of Article II 




55 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, 9 December 1948, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 78. 
56 https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang 
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Intent to destroy an ethnic and religious groups 
The Genocide Convention states the definition of genocide is “any of the 
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group”.  The addition of “in whole or in part” 
emphasizes the meaning of ‘intent to destroy’.  The perpetrator may have more 
intent than means to commit; as a result, the actions committed may seem less 
genocidal in nature than the intent.  However, this does not mean that the 
perpetrator is absolved of the crime of genocide, only that their intent was greater 
than the action.  
In the ICTY case, Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupresˇkic, the tribunal states that 
the intent to destroy turns genocide into “an extreme and most inhumane form of 
persecution.”57 Proving intent is necessary to proving genocide.  It could be 
argued that intent is the most important requirement of genocide; to prove 
genocide the court only needs to prove intent in conjunction with one other 
provision of genocide.  It is not necessary to prove every provision listed in the 
Convention. 
While clearly genocide is a physical crime, intent is the non-physical 
element of the crime.  The non-physical crime of genocide is comprised of two 
points: the “general intent” and “intent to destroy”.   “General intent” has been 
defined in international criminal law by Article 30 of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) as a cognitive process by which the 
 
57 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al. (Trial Judgement), IT-95-16-T, International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 January 2000, available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTY,40276c634.html  
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perpetrator decided on a particular course of action and/or had cognitive 
knowledge of the actions taking place.58  However, the meaning of “intent to 
destroy” is more subjective and goes beyond the objective elements of the offense 
definition.59  To look at the “intent to destroy” practically, it is helpful to look for 
a “surplus of intent”; in layman terms, this means to look for multiple sources of 
intent.60   
The pivotal Prosecutor v. Akayesu judgement defined “intent to destroy” 
as “the specific intention, required as a constitutive element of the crime, which 
demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act charged”61, or that 
the perpetrator has “the clear intent to cause the offense”.62 Genocidal intent was 
described as the “key element” of the offense.63 The International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) required, in addition, the aim to destroy a protected 
group.64 
 
58 Art. 30(1) reads: ‘Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable 
for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are 
committed with intent and knowledge.’; Art. 30(3) reads: ‘For the purposes of this article, 
“knowledge” means awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the 
ordinary course of events. “Know” and “knowingly” shall be construed accordingly.’ 
59  Otto Triffterer, ‘Kriminalpolitische und dogmatische U¨ berlegungen zum Entwurf 
gleichlautender ‘Elements of Crimes’ fu¨r alle Tatbesta¨nde des Vo¨lkermords’, in Bernd 
Schu¨nemann et al. (eds.), Festschrift fu¨r Claus Roxin zum 70. Geburtstag am 15. Mai 2001, 
Beck, Munich, 2001, pp. 1438ff. 
60 Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic´, Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-97-24-T, 31 July 2003, para. 520. 
See also Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, above note 1, paras 119ff, which, in 
essence, characterizes genocide as a crime of (concrete) endangerment (para. 124: ‘completed 
when the relevant conduct presents a concrete threat to the existence of the targeted group …’). 
61 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998, 
para. 498 
62 Ibid, para. 518. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, Prosecutor’s Pre-Trial Brief, Case No. IT-95-10-PT, 19 November 
1998, para. 3.1 (perpetrator ‘knew the likely consequence’ that the committed acts would destroy a 
group in whole or in part).;Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, TJ, above note 29, para. 569 
(‘consciously desired’ the destruction of the group or ‘knew his acts were destroying’). 
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According to the United Nations, to prove intent, an investigation and 
subsequent examination must be conducted “by a competent international or 
national court of law with the jurisdiction to try such cases.”65 
In addition to intent, the crime of genocide requires that a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group be targeted for destruction. On how to define a 
group as a national, ethnical, or racial group, the tribunal in Prosecutor v. Goran 
Jelisić stated: 
. . . it is more appropriate to evaluate the status of a national, 
ethnical or racial group from the point of view of those persons 
who wish to single that group out from the rest of the community. 
The Trial Chamber consequently elects to evaluate membership in 
a national, ethnical or racial group using a subjective criterion. It is 
the stigmatization of a group as a distinct national, ethnical or 
racial unit by the community which allows it to be determined 
whether a targeted population constitutes a national, ethnical or 
racial group in the eyes of the alleged perpetrators.66 
According to this judgment, what is most important to the definition of a 
group is the identification of this group as separate by the perpetrators. In 
response to a 2014 Uyghur militant stabbing, President Xi called for a “struggle 
against terrorism, infiltration and separatism” using the “organs of dictatorship,” 
to show “absolutely no mercy.”67 He also urged the party to use ideas derived 
 
65 United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. “Guidance 
Note 1: When to Refer to a Situation as ‘Genocide’.” United Nations. 
66 Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgement (TC), 14 December 1999, para. 
70.; The same conclusion is found in Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, 
Judgment (TC), 7 June 2001, para. 65: "[…] Moreover, the perpetrators of genocide may 
characterize the targeted group in ways that do not fully correspond to conceptions of the group 
shared generally, or by other segments of society. In such a case, the Chamber is of the opinion 
that, on the evidence, if a victim was perceived by a perpetrator as belonging to a protected group, 
the victim could be considered by the Chamber as a member of the protected group, for the 
purposes of genocide." 
 
67 Ramzy, Austin, and Chris Buckley. “'Absolutely No Mercy': Leaked Files Expose How China 
Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 16 Nov. 
2019, www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html.  
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from the United States’ “war on terror”.68  Chinese officials were told to tell 
people who asked if detention of their family members were the result of a crime 
they had committed  that “it is just that their thinking has been infected by 
unhealthy thoughts.”69 
The Uyghurs can be defined as an ethnic group (the Uyghurs), or a 
religious group (Muslims).  In a statement accusing China of genocide in 
Xinjiang, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo states that recently “local 
authorities dramatically escalated their decades-long campaign of repression 
against Uyghur Muslims and members of other ethnic and religious minority 
groups, including ethnic Kazakhs and ethnic Kyrgyz.”70 
Four hundred pages of internal Chinese files on the Xinjiang camps were 
leaked to the New York Times in November of 2019 by a member of the Chinese 
political establishment.  Within these documents, evidence of the planned and 
systematic elimination of the Uyghurs is clear.  These documents also supply 
coached responses for officials to answer questions that people will have when 
they discover their family and friends have been taken.  Chen Quanguo, Party 
Leader for Xinjiang, told officials in 2016 to “round up everyone who should be 
rounded up.”71 
These factors of intent and the classification of a specific group are 
necessary to prosecute genocide.  These two factors in addition to any of the 
 
68 Ibid. 
69 “Document: What Chinese Officials Told Children Whose Families Were Put in Camps.” The 
New York Times, The New York Times, 16 Nov. 2019. 
70 Pompeo, Michael. “Determination of the Secretary of State on Atrocities in Xinjiang.” U.S. 
Department of State, 19 Jan. 2021. 
71Ramzy, Austin, and Chris Buckley. 
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subsections in Article II of the Genocide Convention individually are enough to 
constitute genocide. The following subsections will analyze which provisions are 
viable in the case of Xinjiang. 
 
Killing members of the group 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 96 (I) of 1946, issued 
during the first session of the United Nations, affirmed that genocide was a crime 
under international law and defined genocide as “a denial of the right of existence 
of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual 
human beings.”72  By this definition, and the definition of genocide in the 
Genocide Convention, there is no minimum number of deaths required for there 
to be genocide.   
What is necessary to constitute genocide is that the killings that do happen 
are done with the motive of destroying a human group in whole or in part.  As has 
been argued, “[genocide] is a consistently controversial topic, one that often leads 
to questions over whether the violence was indeed coordinated or random, 
whether the killing was discriminatorily motivated or simply arbitrary, whether 
the death toll was grossly overestimated or underestimated.”73 
 There is no list or database confirming the number of people who have 
died in the Xinjiang detention camps or post-detention due to trauma and illness 
 
72 United Nations Resolution 96 (I). “The Crime of Genocide.” 11 December 1946. 
73 Ethan R. Ice, Book Note, International Criminal Law in the 21st Century: The Crime of 
Genocide in Darfur, 38 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 193 (2009). 
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resulting from imprisonment. However, there are numerous reports of deaths of 
detained Uyghurs.  
In 2019, a Chinese police officer confirmed the deaths of at least 150 
detainees in Akesu, Xinjiang. That figure could be more than 200 in a single 
internment camp, according to Radio Free Asia. There have been multiple reports 
of alleged deaths from mistreatment within the camps.74  A government official in 
Xinjiang recently reported that in his county, the Uyghur population was 92,000 
in 2016, but as of August 2020 only 20,000 of them remained.  In only four years, 
that is the loss of more than 80% of the population; however, the official stated no 
reason for this dramatic reduction.75 
While there is no minimum number of deaths required for genocide, 
individual deaths that may result from other causes would be difficult to attribute 
genocidal intent to.  There has been no obvious intent to kill or systematic killings 
of Uyghurs.  As a result, it may be hard to prove this provision in court. 
 China has made no comment on these alleged deaths beyond formally 
confirming to the UN the death of a Uyghur man whose family believe had been 
 
74RFA Staff. “At Least 150 Detainees Have Died in One Xinjiang Internment Camp: Police 
Officer.” Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Asia, 29 Oct. 2019, 
www.rfa.org/english/news/uighur/deaths-10292019181322.html.; “Uyghur Muslims Die in Re-
Education Camps, Go Crazy in Psychiatric Hospitals.” Asia News, 26 Apr. 2018, 
asianews.it/news-en/Uyghur-Muslims-die-in-re-education-camps,-go-crazy-in-psychiatric-
hospitals-43612.html.;Aytekin, Emre. “Chinese Torture Allegedly Kills Islamic Scholar.” Anadolu 
Ajansı, 6 Aug. 2018, www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/chinese-torture-allegedly-kills-islamic-
scholar/1169454. 
75 Werleman, CJ. “'Death Is Everywhere': Millions More Uyghurs Missing.” Byline Times, 25 
Aug. 2020, bylinetimes.com/2020/08/24/death-is-everywhere-millions-more-uighurs-missing/.  
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held in a Xinjiang internment camp since 2017.76  Officials maintained that these 
camps are for the sole purpose of reeducation.77 
 
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
Unlike killings, which clearly require death, the category of "causing 
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group" is broad and can include 
almost any type of mental and/or physical torture.  Cases that have used this 
section of the Genocide convention to determine genocide have defined bodily 
and mental harm in very loose terms.  It has been found to include torture (mental 
and physical) without limits to the means or torture and/or treatment that can be 
defined as degrading or persecution. In Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, the 
ICTR Tribunal  defined this subsection of the Convention further by explaining: 
For purposes of interpreting Article 2 (2)(b) of the Statute, the 
Chamber takes serious bodily or mental harm, without limiting itself 
thereto, to mean acts of torture, be they bodily or mental, inhumane 
or degrading treatment, persecution.78 
This Article has been used before to describe the specific instance of 
serious bodily and/or mental harm within detention camps, such as in Prosecutor 
v. Radoslav Brđanin, where the Tribunal extensively detailed instances of serious 
bodily and/or mental harm that took place in a variety of camps and detention 
 
76 Davidson, Helen. “China Confirms Death of Uyghur Man Whose Family Says Was Held in 
Xinjiang Camps.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 2 Oct. 2020, 
www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/02/china-confirms-death-of-uighur-man-whose-family-
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77 Maizland, Lindsay. “China's Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.” Council on Foreign 
Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 1 Mar. 2021, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-
repression-uyghurs-xinjiang.  
78 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement (TC), 2 September 1998, 
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facilities, “in relation to which [the Tribunal] is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt 
that serious bodily and/or mental harm was inflicted ...and, further, that it was 
inflicted intentionally.”79 
For ease of analysis, the subsequent discussion will be divided into three 
sections: general torture , rape and forced abortion, and involuntary organ 
harvesting.  These are some of the main categories of actions that would fall 
under the serious bodily and mental harm prong. 
 
A. Torture 
On the conditions of detainees who are exposed to the death of fellow 
detainees while in internment, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgement 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro states: 
Constantly being exposed to the death and suffering of fellow 
prisoners made it impossible for anyone over any period of time to 
forget in what setting he or she was.80  
When living in an environment of torture, prisoners have no moment of 
relief from that torture.  This kind of environment wears on detainees physically 
and mentally, whether they are actively being tortured or not.  
 
79 Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement (TC), 1 September 2004, 
para. 744. 
80 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)); Order of the Court on 
Provisional Measures, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 13 September 1993, available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/cases,ICJ,3ae6b6721c.html. 
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 Mihrigul Turson, a Uyghur from Xinjiang who later immigrated to Egypt, 
was detained and separated from her triplets upon arrival in Xinjiang in 2015.81   
Turson was retaken to a detention center in 2017.  She claimed she saw nine 
detainees die due to the severe conditions in the camp.82   Turson recounted a time 
she was tortured through electroshock.  She said she was strapped to a chair and a 
helmet put on her head, and then she was electrocuted until froth came from her 
mouth.  She does not remember most of the experience, but she does remember a 
guard telling her that “...being a Uyghur is a crime."83  Tursunay Ziawudun, who 
fled Xinjiang after her release and is now in the US, reported "they had an electric 
stick, I didn't know what it was, and it was pushed inside my genital tract, 
torturing me with an electric shock."84  Former detainees report four kinds of 
electric shock: "the chair, the glove, the helmet, and anal rape with a stick."85 
Twenty other prisoners that the Chinese government moved to a 
psychiatric institution have reported similar torture.  They were accused of being  
politically active professionals and were detained and then deprived of sleep and 
bathroom usage and forced to wear helmets that produced noises for 21 hours 
 
81  After three months of detainment, Turson was told that one of her sons had died in a hospital, 
but was given no reason as to why he was admitted to the hospital in the first place. Watson, Ivan, 
and Ben Westcott. “Uyghur Refugee Tells of Death and Fear inside China's Xinjiang Camps.” 
CNN, Cable News Network, 21 Jan. 2019, www.cnn.com/2019/01/18/asia/uighur-china-detention-
center-intl/index.html. 
82Watson, Ivan, and Ben Westcott. 
83 Danilova, Maria. “Woman Describes Torture, Beatings in Chinese Detention Camp.” AP 
NEWS, Associated Press, 27 Nov. 2018, apnews.com/61cdf7f5dfc34575aa643523b3c6b3fe. 
 
84 Gunter, Joel, et al. “'Their Goal Is to Destroy Everyone': Uyghur Camp Detainees Allege 




each day.  Reports indicate they cried and screamed all day. At the time of the 
reporting, these prisoners had been held  at a psychiatric facility for three months 
and forced to pay for their stay.86 
Other prisoners report being waterboarded and strapped to a “tiger chair,” 
which is a metal chair-like structure used for torture.  Some inmates have 
committed suicide as a result of this torture, according to reports.  The guards 
reportedly ordered other detainees to see if people were dead, and if they were, 
the guards would drag the dead body out by their feet. 87  
Sautbay, whose experiences were previously discussed above, reported 
that one of her friends on the nursing staff gave medications and injections to 
those who fought back or were not easily taught.  Sautbay never saw this with her 
own eyes but remembers inmates being taken and then returning dazed and more 
pliable.  Others report cognitive decline in inmates after medical procedures.88  
An Amnesty International spokesperson said they heard similar claims of forced 
injections.89  Another ex-detainee said he was forced to stand for hours on end, 
chanting “long live Xi Jinping.”  Detainees have also been forced to eat pork and 
drink alcohol, which is not Halal and against the Muslim faith.90  China has not 
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directly responded to torture allegations, and Beijing maintains these camps are 
strictly for re-education.  
 
B. Rape of Detained Women 
Within international humanitarian law, serious sexual assault is prohibited 
under the Geneva Conventions and its additional protocols, which apply during 
armed conflict.91  Serious sexual assault and rape was also first classified as a 
crime against humanity under Article II of Control Council Law No. 10, 
Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, which was the basis for the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunals, and which states: “Crimes against Humanity. 
Atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or 
religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country 
where perpetrated.”92 Rape is also covered in the ICTY Statute, the ICTR Statute, 
and most extensively, the ICC Rome Statute (Control Council Law 10 was the 
first instance, but subsequent statutes have codified it as well).  
 
91 Art. 3, which prohibits “outrages upon personal dignity, and in particular, humiliating and 
degrading treatment”; Art. 147 of Geneva Convention IV; Art. 85(4)(c) of Additional Protocol I; 
and Arts. 4(1) and 4(2)(a) of Additional Protocol II. In an aide-memoire of 3 Dec. 1992 and in its 
recommendations to the Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in 
Rome, July 1998, the ICRC has confirmed that the act of “wilfully causing great suffering or 
serious injury to body or health”, categorised as a grave breach in each of the four Geneva 
Conventions, does include the crime of rape. 
92 Trials of war criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council law no. 
10 Nuernberg, October -April 1949. [Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., to 1953, 1949] Web.. 
Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <lccn.loc.gov/2011525364>. 
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The ICTR case Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, discusses rape in the 
context of genocide and underlines that rape is a method of committing 
genocide.93   It defines rape as “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed 
on a person under circumstances which are coercive.”94  The prosecuted, 
Akayesu, was the mayor of Taba, Rwanda during the 1994 genocide where Tutsi 
women were systematically raped by troops.  Akayesu was present at some of 
these acts. During this case, the ICTR recognized that rape and sexual violence 
can amount to genocide when committed with the intention of destroying a 
particular group in whole or in part.  
 This was the first case to define rape in the context of international law, 
and further found rape as a tool of genocide.  The key is "they constitute genocide 
in the same way as any other act as long as they were committed with the specific 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such. Indeed, 
rape and sexual violence certainly constitute infliction of serious bodily and 
mental harm on the victims and are even, according to the Chamber, one of the 
worst ways of inflict harm on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily and 
mental harm."95 
 
The Tribunal in Prosecutor v Akayesu provided an expansive definition of sexual 
violence, in addition to its definition of rape, finding it to be: 
…any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under 
circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence is not limited to 
 
93 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija (Trial Judgement), IT-95-17/1-T, International Criminal Tribunal 
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physical invasion of the human body and may include acts which 
do not involve penetration or even physical contact … coercive 
circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of physical force. 
Threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which 
prey on fear or desperation may constitute coercion, and coercion 
may be inherent in certain circumstances, such as armed conflict or 
the military presence of Interahamwe among refugee Tutsi women 
at the bureau communal.96 
 
Akayesu further describes rape as "[l]ike torture, rape is used for such 
purposes as intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, 
control or destruction of a person. Like torture, rape is a violation of personal 
dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture when inflicted by or at the instigation 
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting 
in an official capacity"97 
 Scientific studies show the mental harm associated with rape. Rape 
victims have one of the highest risks of developing PTSD or related conditions 
when compared to other trauma victims.  Without treatment, the symptoms of 
PTSD, such as depression, severe anxiety, and numbness, can last for years to a 
lifetime and amplify as time goes on.  Rape victims are more likely to experience 
long lasting mental and physical problems than those who experienced trauma in 
combat, an assault, or a life-threatening accident.98 
Applying this analysis to the situation in Xinjiang, anecdotal evidence 
paints a picture of extensive, systematic rape against Uyghur women. Previous 
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detainees have mentioned that they noticed guards coming to take girls in the 
night, with one woman reporting being tortured and gang raped on multiple 
occasions, each time by two or three men.  This woman stated that women were 
removed from their cells “every night”; she said some women never returned and 
those that did were threatened against telling others what happened.99 
A Kazakh woman who was detained for 18 months reported being forced 
to "...remove [women’s] clothes above the waist and handcuff them so they 
cannot move...then I would leave the women in the room and a man would enter - 
some Chinese man from outside or policeman. I sat silently next to the door, and 
when the man left the room I took the woman for a shower."100  She said that 
Chinese men  "would pay money to have their pick of the prettiest young 
inmates."101 
Qelbinur Sedik, a Chinese language teacher brought into the camps who 
has since fled, reports that when asking a Chinese policewoman about systematic 
rape she said “'...the rape has become a culture. It is gang rape and the Chinese 
police not only rape them but also electrocute them. They are subject to horrific 
torture.'"102 
In separate testimony to the Uyghur Human Rights Project, Sedik 
described the public gang rape of a female inmate (who was about 20 years old) 
 
99 She also says "they don't only rape but also bite all over your body, you don't know if they are 
human or animal. They didn't spare any part of the body, they bit everywhere leaving horrible 
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in front of 100 detainees, she was forced to make a confession and "after that, in 
front of everyone, the police took turns to rape her...While carrying out this test, 
they watched people closely and picked out anyone who resisted, clenched their 
fists, closed their eyes, or looked away, and took them for punishment."103 
These and other multiple reports of rape and how it is carried out in the 
Xinjiang camps implies that it is systematic and against the Uyghur ethnic 
minority. Consequently, the raping of Uyghur women being held in detention 
camps is arguably, in itself, a crime of genocide.  
Akayesu qualified rape was genocide because it was committed "solely 
against Tutsi women, many of whom were subjected to the worst public 
humiliation, mutilated, and raped several times, often in public, in the Bureau 
Communal premises or in other public places, and often by more than one 
assailant. These rapes resulted in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi 
women, their families and their communities. Sexual violence was an integral part 
of the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically 
contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a 
whole."104 This is an extremely similar story to the above mentioned reports from 
Xinjiang. 
The Chinese government has not responded directly to questions about 
rape and torture of inmates. To amount these rapes to genocide, the rapes would 
have to be proven to be undeniably systematic, which would require further 
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evidence to prove.  For this reason, these rapes alone may not qualify genocide 
but do qualify crimes against humanity.105 
 
C. Organ Harvesting106 
In accordance with the United Nations Trafficking in Persons, The 
American Society of Transplantation and the American Society of Transplant 
Surgeons, organ trafficking is defined as: 
the recruitment, transport, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, 
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power, of a 
position of vulnerability, of the giving or receiving of payments or 
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over 
another person, for the purpose of exploitation by the removal of 
organs, tissues or cells for transplantation.107  
 
Organ harvesting violates this subsection of the Genocide Convention as it 
causes serious bodily harm to its victims.   
The organ trafficking industry has benefited from the ever increasing need 
for transplants and the shortage of organs in many countries, especially in China 
where they have one of the lowest organ donation rates in the world.108 
 
105 “For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of the following acts 
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack: g. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;” 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2187, No. 
38544. 
106 “Bloody Harvest/The Slaughter: An Update” p.424 Authors: David Kilgour, Ethan Gutmann, 
and David Matas, June 22, 2016. 
107 Budiani-Saberi, D. A., and F. L. Delmonico. “Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism: A 
Commentary on the Global Realities.” American Journal of Transplantation, vol. 8, no. 5, 2008, 
pp. 925–929., doi:10.1111/j.1600-6143.2008.02200.x.  
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 China is no stranger to organ harvesting; decades of research has shown 
that Beijing is systematically killing prisoners on demand to supply its organ 
transplant industry. People from all over the world come to China to have 
transplants.109 Reports indicate that over ninety five percent of organ donors in 
China are prisoners.110  
The China Tribunal, led by prominent lawyers, human rights experts, and 
a transplant surgeon has determined that China continues to harvest organs from 
prisoners and dissidents.  China has an exceptionally short waiting time for 
organs, suggesting they have a large supply.  In addition, it is reported that 
doctors have been instructed to cut out organs from live patients.  It is speculated 
that much of this organ harvesting is happening within the Xinjiang Camps.111 
Ethan Gutmann, Nobel Peace Prize nominee and author of “The 
Slaughter: Mass Killings, Organ Harvesting, and China’s Secret Solution to Its 
Dissident Problem,” says this is not a new issue.  According to Gutmann, 
surgeons have been extracting organs from Uyghur prisoners since 1994.  He 
believes that the Communist Party is now amping up their organ harvesting 
efforts once again in Xinjiang. “Over fifteen million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz 
and Hui have been blood tested, compatible with tissue matching. Over one 
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million are in camps. So yes, the CCP has created a policy of ethnic cleansing – a 
potentially very profitable one.”112 
Some scholars and activists have argued that China's organ harvesting 
constitutes  genocide. But arguably this lacks intent because China is doing this to 
other groups - Falun Gong, dissidents of various sorts, etc. Because of this, it is 
hard to argue that this is genocide since the intent component is lacking. Despite 
the possibility that this might be used as ethnic cleansing and the abhorrent nature 
of these types of actions, this would be harder to prove in court.    
 
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part 
According to Akayesu, this phrase means “methods of destruction by 
which the perpetrator does not immediately kill the members of the group, but 
which, ultimately, seek their physical destruction.”113  This includes, “inter alia, 
subjecting a group of people to a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from 
homes and the reduction of essential medical services below minimum 
requirement.”114 
 Kayishema and Ruzindana, from the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, describes  “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
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calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”115 as 
“includ[ing] circumstances which will lead to a slow death, for example, lack of 
proper housing, clothing, hygiene and medical care or excessive work or physical 
exertion”116 and “methods of destruction which do not immediately lead to the 
death of members of the group. [T]he conditions of life envisaged include rape, 
the starving of a group of people, reducing required medical services below a 
minimum, and withholding sufficient living accommodation for a reasonable 
period.”117 
As seen, the intent behind China’s actions in Xinjiang shares the same 
mens rea as the crimes of murder or extermination. These harmful conditions and 
abuses constitute the definition of genocide and fall under the provision of 
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part.  
The internment conditions and torture of the Uyghurs falls directly under 
“deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part.”  China could claim that these deaths 
were not “deliberate”; however, If officials see that the conditions they placed 
these people in are killing them, and then do nothing to change those conditions, 
that is purposeful murder by conditions.  
 “In part” needs to be emphasized, as many abuses such as rape, sleep 
deprivation, and starvation may not always kill inmates (though sometimes they 
 




do), but certainly they significantly damage the physical and mental well-being of 
members of the group and for the rest of their lives. In addition, it would be nearly 
impossible for the group to be destroyed “in whole”.  This again emphasizes the 
intent needed to commit genocide that the Genocide Convention states.  While a 
country may not be able to destroy a group “in whole”, their intent to do so and 
destruction of a group “in part” is still considered genocide. 
 
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
 According to Akayesu, “[I]mposing measures intended to prevent births 
within the group” includes: “sexual mutilation, the practice of sterilization, forced 
birth control, separation of the sexes and prohibition of marriages.  In patriarchal 
societies, where membership of a group is determined by the identity of the 
father, an example . . . is the case where, during rape, a woman of the said group 
is deliberately impregnated by a man of another group, with the intent to have her 
give birth to a child who will consequently not belong to its mother's group.”118  
The Chamber noted that the measures may be mental as well as physical.  “For 
instance, rape can be a measure intended to prevent births when the person raped 
refuses subsequently to procreate, in the same way that members of a group can 
be led, through threats or trauma, not to procreate.”119 
 Birth prevention and abortion can be directly used to commit genocide, 
and it can be one of the main tactics used to bring about the destruction of a 
group.  In addition to the previously discussed rape and abortions within the 
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Xinjiang camps, China has also used forced sterilization and IUDs to prevent 
births within the Uyghur group. 
After a visit to Kazakhstan, Gulzira Mogdyn was detained in Xinjiang.  
She reported that after doctors discovered she was pregnant, they cut her fetus out 
without giving her anesthesia.120  One woman reports being repeatedly raped, and 
as a result, becoming pregnant twice.121  Both times she was forced to terminate 
her pregnancy.122 Another woman reports being forced to have two abortions 
while living in Xinjiang. Two other foreign national husbands have spoken out, 
saying their Uyghur wives who were in a detention camp in Xinjiang were forced 
to terminate their pregnancies.  Multiple women have reported being forced to 
have abortions within the camp.123   Other women who have now fled to 
Kazakhstan report having contraceptive devices implanted against their will while 
held in detention.124  
Adrian Zenz calls the Xinjiang Conflict a genocide due to issues of birth 
suppression. His findings provide some of the strongest evidence yet that 
Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang meet the genocide criteria cited in the Genocide 
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Convention; however, his research alone is not grounds enough to prove the 
validity of birth suppression equaling genocide. He cites the drop of the growth 
rate in Xinjiang, as well as plans for mass female sterilization, birth control 
violations that are punishable by internment, forced IUDs and sterilization, and 
the rapid growth rate of the Han in Xinjiang.125 
 Witness testimonies show that Xinjiang authorities have been 
administering drugs and injections to women in internment without their 
knowledge of the drugs or their consent, forcibly implanting intrauterine 
contraceptive devices (IUDs) prior to internment, coercing women to be 
surgically sterilized, and using internment as punishment for birth control 
violations, as mandated by government documents. In 2018, 80% of all IUD 
placements in China were performed in Xinjiang.  Xinjiang planned to subject at 
least 80% of minority prefecture women to birth prevention surgeries by 2019.126 
Using XUAR Statistical Yearbooks, Dr. Adrian Zenz showed that the 
natural population growth rate in Xinjiang’s minority regions have fallen by 84% 
in the two largest Uyghur prefectures between 2015 and 2018, and declined 
further in several regions in 2019.  In 2020, one Uyghur region had a birth rate of 
almost zero.127 
Contrary to Zenz’s assertion, the Chinese Embassy tweeted that “[t]he 
[Uyghur] population grew from 10.2 million in 2010 to 12.7 million in 2018, an 
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increase of more than 25 percent...the population of Han people in the region 
increased by just 2 percent to 9 million over the same period."128 China has 
strongly denied claims of forced sterilization and argues that “[i]n the process of 
eradicating extremism, the minds of Uygur women were emancipated and gender 
equality and reproductive health were promoted, making them no long baby-
making machines, women have since been striving to become healthy, confident 
and independent.”129 
In some situations this forced abortion and birth prevention could rise to 
the level of genocide; however, given the cultural and historical particularities of 
Chinese family planning policies it may be hard to prove in this context. 
While forced abortion is not explicitly legal in China, it has de facto 
legality according to provincial family planning laws. Xinjiang Province family 
planning laws only mention abortion once, and that is to ban women from having 
selective-sex based abortions.  These laws do not say a woman will be forced to 
terminate an illegal pregnancy, but strongly encourage it and have legal 
consequences for women who do not pursue abortion, such as internment.  
Chinese officials have forced women to terminate pregnancies since the 
implementation of the original One-Child Policy.  China has not avoided the topic 
of state-mandated birth control, saying on Twitter in January of 2021 that Uyghur 
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women had been “emancipated” and were “no longer baby-making machines.”130  
Because of this cultural context, it would be hard to prove genocidal intent based 
on birth laws. 
 
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the Chinese government 
ratified, defines children as persons under the age of 18.  The Convention asserts 
that the family is the natural environment for the growth and well-being of 
children. This convention requires governments to ensure that a “child shall not 
be separated from his or her parents against their will, except when competent 
authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law 
and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the 
child.”131 
In the ICTY case Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, forcible transfer of 
children has been found to apply within, as well as outside of, national 
boundaries. As the ICTY found in that case, it is “well established that forcible 
displacements of people within national boundaries are covered by the concept of 
forcible transfer.”132 
When authorities detain the parents of an Uyghur child in Xinjiang, this 
child would normally be cared for by his or her extended family.  However, 
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officials have started finding these children and removing them from their 
families to be placed in state institutions.  In 2016, the Chinese Communist Party 
Secretary in Xinjiang, Chen Quanguo, ordered that officials place all Xinjiang 
orphans into state institutions by 2020.133 This essentially places Uyghur children 
into the hands of the Han Chinese to be raised as Han.  The government 
encourages locals to send children whose parents cannot be found to these state 
orphanages.  With a million people or more in detainment, the number of children 
that have missing parents is very high.  The government's stated goal is to have all 
these children placed in institutions by 2020.  Some areas even have quotas of 
children that must be sent to these state institutions.134   
All the crimes being committed against the Uyghurs of Xinjiang constitute 
crimes against humanity; however, due to the issue of explicit proof for many 
subsections of the Genocide Convention it seems improbable that a genocide 
conviction could be proven in court.  Beijing seems to be committing many of the 
actions prohibited in Article II against the Uyghur population, but the intent 
component for many of these is hard to prove, such as birth prevention and killing 
members of the group.  The following chapter will explore methods of deferring 
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Chapter Three: Justifications for China’s Actions 
 Like the US, China has passed certain measures to protect against 
terrorism, both external and internal. It also wields considerable soft power on the 
international scene. In the context of the allegations of genocide, China is able to 
utilize these pre-existing tools as a defensive strategy to protect against such 
allegations. The methods that will be discussed are: 1) China's laws and actions 
that can be used to defer accusations of genocide, and 2) problems with the 
Genocide Convention in the context of China and the Uyghurs.  China has 
employed all these tactics to legitimize the state’s actions and relieve legal 
pressures.  The layering of these tactics has created an invisible, but palpable 
protective shield for the Chinese government. 
 
China's Laws and Actions that Can Be Used to Defer Accusations of 
Genocide 
Counter-Extremism in China 
In 2018, China declared that Xinjiang needed to be stopped from 
becoming “China’s Syria or China’s Libya”.135  In 2014, China launched the 
“Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Terrorism,” after four attacks that took 
place between 2009 and 2014.136  This was the beginning of the Xinjiang police 
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state with rapid police recruitment, establishment of police stations, and the grid-
based security system.137 
The People’s Republic of China passed the Anti-Terror Law of 2016, 
months before the Xinjiang Camps were estimated to have begun in earnest.  The 
law defines extremism as “the ideological basis of terrorism” or, more broadly, 
“inciting hatred, discrimination, or agitating violence through distorting religious 
doctrines or other means.”138 Separatism, terrorism, and extremism were listed as 
the “three evil forces”.139   China describes these actions as preventative measures 
against terrorism. The emphasis on religious separatism and extremism 
underscores the government’s actions in Xinjiang to date.  This emphasis is 
justified and provoked by the government’s perception of domestic terrorism in 
China.  
In 2017, China published a list of illegal extremist activities.  By these 
regulations, it is forbidden to use one’s “appearance, clothing and personal 
adornment, symbols, and other markings to disseminate religious fanaticism, 
disseminate religious extremist ideologies, or coerce others to wear extremist 
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clothing or religious extremist symbols.”140 The state has also listed “unusual 
behaviors” that are considered signs of extremism and require monitoring. These 
include storing large amounts of food, quitting smoking or drinking, and not 
crying at funerals.141 
China uses two tactics to achieve their goals according to their definition 
of extremism:  “de-extremification” (去极端化) and “counter-extremism” (反极
端化).142 Counter-extremism tactics are the prevalent method for Chinese 
officials; these tactics focus on removing the problem by removing the 
community as a whole rather than removing individual people. As a local 
Xinjiang official stated, “[y]ou can’t uproot all the weeds hidden among the crops 
in the field one by one — you need to spray chemicals to kill them all.”143 
China’s current campaign is an attempt to remove extremist tendencies 
from the “souls” of the Uyghurs.144  This centralized focus paves the way for the 
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Use of Extremism Terminology 
The September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States were a political boon 
for Beijing; China sided with the U.S. and rode the highly emotional wave of anti-
terrorism, claiming to be a victim of international terrorism.  Authorities 
immediately asserted that Xinjiang opposition was connected to greater 
international terrorism.  Beijing stated that “Osama bin Laden and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan had provided the ‘Eastern Turkestan’ (another name for the Xinjiang 
Province) terrorist organizations with equipment and financial resources and 
trained their personnel,” and that one particular organization, the “Eastern 
Turkestan Islamic Movement” (ETIM) was a “major component of the terrorist 
network headed by Osama bin Laden.”145  
 In October 2001, China’s Foreign Minister declared that “efforts to fight 
against East Turkistan terrorist forces should become a part of the international 
efforts and should also win support and understanding.”146 China released a 
number of documents detailing purported “bombings and assassinations” by 
Xinjiang separatist groups.147  However, these documents have numerous 
inconsistencies and lack corroborating, independent intelligence.148  The United 
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States even publicly emphasized that the international war on terror should not be 
used by China to justify internal repression against political opponents or 
minorities.149  China continued to use this rhetoric, especially internally, to stir up 
anti-Muslim and anti-separatist sentiment.  
The use of anti-terrorism language is politically beneficial on a global 
scale to legitimize China’s actions in Xinjiang.  By calling their actions anti-
terrorism efforts and stressing the need for such, Beijing diminishes the extent of 
their actions and implies they are necessary, domestic protection efforts. China’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains: “The relevant practices in China are no 
different from those in the UK, France and the US. They are all the active efforts 
we have made to prevent terrorism and eliminate extremism with the view to 
nipping the evil in the bud.”150  However, this statement came two months after a 
senior Chinese Communist Party official stated “there is no such thing as re-
education centers.” The centers were quickly exposed by aerial imagery.151 
As a result, China’s use of anti-terrorism propaganda has already given 
Beijing years to deal with the Uyghurs however they like.  By using the blanket 
excuse of anti-terrorism, the global community’s focus was diverted from what 
was actually happening to the Uyghurs.   
 
 
149 “U.S., China Stand Against Terrorism: Remarks by President Bush and President Jiang 
Zemin,” press conference at the Western Suburb Guest House in Shanghai, People's Republic of 
China. 
150 People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua 
Chunying's Regular Press Conference.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of 
China, 24 October 2018. 
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China’s Soft Power 
A recent example of how prosecuting genocide before the ICJ can be seen 
in the ongoing case of Myanmar.  Under Article IX of the Genocide Convention, 
Myanmar was accused of genocide by The Gambia before the ICJ because of its 
treatment of the Rohingya.  Due to the relatively small amount of influence 
Myanmar has over The Gambia, The Gambia faced little pressure from 
consequences that would disrupt their country.  As a result, it was safe for The 
Gambia to file against Myanmar. This facet of the Genocide Convention works if 
no consequences will be brought against the accusatory country, but due to 
China’s significant soft power, the process is not as simple in this case.   
The Belt and Road Initiative, China Pakistan Economic Corridor, treaty 
ports, and big ticket global infrastructure and energy projects have given China 
significant political and economic influence in Asia, The Middle East, Africa, and 
Latin America.  Many countries currently rely on China for infrastructure, energy, 
and trade. 
The following two maps show (1) the location of thousands of Chinese-
funded development projects across the globe using data from AidData's 
Geocoded Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset released September 11, 2018 
and (2) the size of incoming Chinese investment relative to GDP.  
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(1) Map by Soren Patterson for AidData.  (2) Source: China Global Investment Tracker, World Bank 
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China’s global soft power significantly inhibits the number of countries 
that have the inclination to criticize China.  As a result of its global influence, it is 
unlikely that accusations of genocide would be filed against China. 
This shows another relative weakness of the Genocide Convention: it 
lacks a neutral body in charge of holding countries responsible for genocide, and 
consequently countries that are economically dependent on a more powerful 
country will be less likely to speak up against atrocities being committed there. 
 Turkey’s reaction to the Uyghur Crisis is a clear example of how China’s 
soft power has directly impacted a country’s response.  In 2009, the Turkish 
President Erdogan called China’s repression of Uygurs a “genocide”.152  The 
Uyghur people are ethnically Turkish and share a similar language, so escaping to 
Turkey seemed to be the best option for many Uyghur’s in Xinjiang. Turkey had 
offered asylum to the Uyghurs since 1952.153   
However, economic and political difficulties led Turkey to depend on 
China.  In 2018, China loaned Turkey $3.6 billion, and another $1 billion in 
2019.154  Gradually, the Turkish government began raiding Uyghur homes and 
coordinating deportations with Beijing.  In 2020, Turkey ratified an extradition 
 







deal with China in order to ‘combat terrorism’.155  This drastic change in Turkish 
policy has made the Uyghurs’  historical asylum an unsafe haven.156 
China’s soft power has also been exerted through the media. Nine minutes 
into the credits of the film Mulan, Disney thanked the publicity department of the 
CPC Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region committee, which is exactly where the 
atrocities against the Uyghurs  are taking place and where the movie was filmed.  
This was used to bring positive media to China’s actions in Xinjiang.157 
 China’s soft power is not only preventing nations from bringing formal 
accusations against China, but is also being directly used against non-supportive 
countries, such as Turkey.  Without a safe way for countries to speak against 
China, it is doubtful that they will.  This limits the power that the ICJ or other 
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Problems with the Genocide Convention in the Context of China and 
the Uyghurs 
Nature of Genocide and Cultural Genocide 
While the Holocaust was the catalyst for the Genocide Convention, 
genocide has not been restricted to the scale and level of atrocities committed 
during the Holocaust.  Since the Holocaust, the word has witnessed the 
Cambodian Genocide, the Rwandan Genocide, the Bosnian Genocide, and the 
Darfur Genocide.  However, in these applications of the Genocide Convention, 
the explicit intent to kill and physical killings were much more obvious than in 
Xinjiang.  As a result, it is unclear how to apply the Convention in the context of 
Xinjiang. 
This issue is currently playing out on the geopolitical scale.  Former 
Secretary of State Pompeo, in January of 2021, was the first American diplomat 
to call what is happening in Xinjiang a genocide.158  However, his statement was 
quickly backpedaled by the State Department, claiming there was insufficient 
evidence to conclude that genocide was happening; the State Department came to 
this conclusion due to the high threshold needed to prosecute genocide (as has 
been seen in the prosecution of previous genocides such as the Holocaust, the 
Bosnian Genocide and the Rwandan Genocide). Countering the State 
Department’s judgement, in February of 2021, the Dutch parliament passed a 
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non-binding motion declaring that the treatment of the Muslim Uyghur minority 
in China amounted to genocide.159 
Arguably, this back and forth is caused by the fact that the Uyghur 
Genocide lacks rapid extermination, a main trait of all previous genocides 
prosecuted under international law.  Extermination is happening in Xinjiang; it is 
just happening more gradually than in previous cases.  Based on current 
knowledge, most Uyghur deaths are a by-product of torture or inhumane 
conditions.  This is why many scholars use forced sterilization statistics to qualify 
the Uyghur Genocide, as previously discussed.  However, the legitimacy of this 
argument can also be debated.  Birth prevention and forcible transfers of Uyghur 
children have already heavily impacted the Uyghur population. Even if these 
points are unlikely to succeed as a claim under international law because of the 
difficulty of proving intent with respect to the Uyghurs specifically, this practice 
if continued will have significant negative impacts on the Uyghur population. 
This brings up concerns when it comes to the definition of genocide.  
While the definition laid out in the Genocide Convention has been adequate when 
prosecuting previous, rapid genocides, there is no guidance on a genocide 
conviction outside of that context. There are also many genocides that have not 
been prosecuted; for example, nothing happened internationally about the 
Cambodian Genocide. 
 
159 “Dutch Parliament Says China's Treatment of Uyghurs Is Genocide.” Human Rights News | Al 
Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 26 Feb. 2021, www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/26/dutch-parliament-says-
chinas-treatment-of-uighurs-is-genocide.  
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In an ever-evolving modern world, the means to commit genocide is also 
ever-changing.  By using the Holocaust as a basis, which the Genocide 
Convention was created in reaction to, all undefined forms of genocide are 
theoretically non-prosecutable.  To modernize genocide legislation, a modern 
precedent needs to take place. This can only be created through new trials and 
case law, such as with the expansion of the understanding of rape as a means of 
genocide in the Akayesu case.  If perpetrators of modern genocides are never 
convicted because their crimes do not meet Holocaust-era standards, the Genocide 
Convention will eventually be rendered useless.  
Cultural genocide (also known as ethnocide or cultural cleansing), 
distinguished by lawyer Raphael Lemkin in 1944, is the most widely discussed 
subset of genocide.  It is defined by the Armenian Genocide Museum as “acts and 
measures undertaken to destroy nations' or ethnic groups' culture through 
spiritual, national, and cultural destruction." Article 7 of a 1994 draft of the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples used the term 
"cultural genocide" but did not include a definition.  Cultural genocide has been 
present in previously prosecuted genocides, but has never been used as a stand-
alone concept. There is no current legal basis to render a conviction of  cultural 
genocide other than convicting all crimes separately; however, this method does 
not make the true weight of a cultural genocide known.  
Using cultural genocide as a stand-alone concept would open up the door 
for this more modern version of genocide to be prosecuted.  The concept covers 
not only the physical destruction of a group, but the intent to destroy a culture.  
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This would provide an avenue to protect these marginalized groups where other 
forms of law may not work to protect them. 
Due to the before mentioned cultural destruction, transfer of children, birth 
prevention and forced migration160 of Xinjiang’s Uyghurs, numerous scholars 
have claimed the Uyghurs are experiencing a cultural genocide.161   
 
 
Reservations to Article IX of the Genocide Convention 
Under the Genocide Convention, one of the avenues used to prosecute 
states relies on signatory states in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the ICJ.  This 
allows states that are not party to genocide to bring claims against states that they 
view as being responsible for violating the Genocide Convention. In 2019, it was 
the Gambia who formally filed a claim against Myanmar, citing the erga omnes 
character of the obligations enshrined in the Genocide Convention.  While the 
case is still ongoing, “the Court is of the opinion that the Rohingya in Myanmar 
 
160 Leaked official documents indicate Chinese officials are forcing Uyghurs who currently live in 
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been moved and the Chinese government has refused to comment. Bostock, Bill. “Leaked Chinese 
Report Suggests It Is Forcing Uyghurs to Take Jobs Thousands of Miles Away to Change the 
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remain extremely vulnerable, observing in particular that the Fact-Finding 
Mission concluded in September 2019 that the Rohingya people remained at 
serious risk of genocide.”162 
The ability for states to bring claims against other states for violation of 
the Genocide Convention comes from Article IX of the Genocide Convention, 
which states: “Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the 
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those 
relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts 
enumerated in Article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice 
at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.”163 
Multiple states, including China, have made reservations to Article IX, 
either limiting the applicability of the provision to situations where both parties 
consent, or, like China, explicitly denying its applicability entirely.164  As a result 
of this reservation, there is less opportunity to bring China to court, narrowing the 
possibility for investigation, trial, and conviction.  wWith the reservation, even if 
other countries weren't influenced by China's soft power, they'd have no recourse 
to bring a claim against China before the ICJ. 
There have been many objections to the reservation of Article IX, namely 
the dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma, who discussed this reservation in context 
 
162 International Court of Justice. Unofficial Press Release: Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar). 23 Jan. 2020. 
163 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, 9 December 1948, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 78, p. 277, available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ac0.html [accessed 5 March 2021] 
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Convention."Reservations and Declarations, UN General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 18 April 1983, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 78. 
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of the Rwandan Genocide.  He argues that the reservation of Article IX is 
functionally against the Genocide Convention as a whole  due to the fact that 
“reservations to a clause concerning dispute settlement are contrary to the object 
and purpose of the treaty if the provision is the raison d’être of the treaty ⎯ The 
object and purpose of the Genocide Convention is the prevention and 
punishment of the crime of genocide, and this encompasses holding a state 
responsible for violating its obligations under the Convention.”165 
Despite such objections, given that a number of states have reservations to 
Article IX, this has been at least tacitly accepted by the international community. 
By limiting the ability to bring China to the jurisdiction of the ICJ, China is 
protecting itself from facing prosecution.  This is in no way completely protects 
China from the jurisdiction of the court; however, it does create limitations, since 
it forecloses the ability of neutral States to bring claims against China before the 
ICJ. 
 While the Genocide Convention isn't necessary to hold a country 
responsible for genocide, because genocide is a jus cogens norm, the problem of 
enforcement is always going to be an issue, especially when dealing with a 
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Final Observations 
Crimes against humanity that could be considered genocidal in nature are 
being carried out within Xinjiang, although proving in court that China is actively 
committing a genocide seems currently unfeasible.  By effectively making 
Xinjiang a prison-state, China has kept foreign media out and kept Uyghur 
testimonies locked inside.  In addition, China is using a highly sophisticated 
media strategy to legitimize actions that aligns domestic and trans-national anti-
terrorism legislation, anti-terrorism language, modern genocidal strategies, and 
exertion of soft power to keep countries from speaking out against China.  
Although representatives from multiple countries have called this situation 
a genocide, the nature of genocide in the law and previously convicted genocides 
set a precedent that the situation in Xinjiang does not meet.  This, in addition to 
the reservation to Article IX, makes it hard to provide a substantial, legal basis to 
accuse China of genocide. A modernized definition of genocide that included 
cultural genocide would be necessary to be able to attempt a prosecution against 
China for the Uyghur Genocide.   
Nevertheless, the Uyghurs are facing severe persecution that could, in 
time, destroy the population of this minority group. Outside of the Xinjiang 
camps, Uyghur women are being sterilized, preventing them from bearing 
offspring.  Children are removed from their families and transferred to non-
Uyghurs, and adults are being forced to move from their homeland to locations 
across the country in an attempt to diasporize the Uyghurs.  Historically protected 
mosques and religious buildings have been completely destroyed and replaced 
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with government-approved architecture.  Uyghurs are constantly monitored and 
can be subject to police investigation at any time. 
Inside the re-education camps, extreme conditions cause the death of 
inmates.  The Uyghurs are forced to strip themselves of their religion, culture, 
language, and identity.  If they refuse, they are subjected to torture and forced 
injections.  Their organs are being harvested and their labor exploited.  Uyghur 
women are raped and forced to have abortions. 
Previous examples have shown what happens when states fail to act 
against genocide.  Overt action may be politically and economically inconvenient 
for nations, but continuing to allow these atrocities undermines not only the 
effectiveness of international law, but also the value of human life for the 
convenience of a few.  “Never again” became the slogan against genocide after 
the Holocaust, and yet genocide continues to occur again and again. The world 
community must step in to confront China. 
Bringing formal accusations against China does not guarantee an 
investigation, and an investigation does not guarantee China’s conviction or 
liberation for the Uyghurs.  Such litigation would involve jurisdictional and 
interpretational complexities; however, with the help of governments and the 
global population, these complexities can be overcome with an updated approach 
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